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Abstract 
From 1972 to 1993 Denmark staged four referenda on the EU. Two of them in particular hold valuable 
lessons for Britain seeking new terms - in June 1992 on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), 
the Danes voted “NO”with a slim majority; this was followed by another vote on the treaty in May 1993 on the 
Edinburgh Agreement with a “YES” vote.  Joergen Oerstroem Moeller was directly involved in all four 
referenda and served 1989-1997 as State-Secretary in the Royal Danish Foreign Ministry. The result of a 
referendum may and often will be decided by policy decisions shaping the electorates’ perception long before 
the voting takes place. The majority votes according to instinct and intuition and is often guided by emotions. 
The Danish case highlights the importance of defining clearly specific exceptions, working hard to explain the 
case (at home and abroad),  establishing good-will, and conveying that exceptions are in principle temporary 
and do not require treaty changes.  The objectives laid out at the start of the process must be achievable. 
The member state in question should not manoeuvre itself into humiliating back-pedalling at the final 
negotiation round: if so it arouses suspicion among the electorate that it is being manipulated and deceived. 
During the campaign media attention will primarily focus on dissent and scepticism presenting the 
establishment with the tedious task of confuting accusations of all kinds. The YES camp will be pushed into 
the defensive by the NO camp setting the agenda. Time and effort and political capital needed to be invested 
for the positive outcome. 
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People’s reaction faced with a referendum on 
the EU 
 
In a national election political parties confront the 
electorate with fairly united positions, draw on the 
existing party machinery having proved itself in 
previous elections, and work on party programs 
supplemented by a record of how they performed 
in government or opposition. 
 
A referendum is completely different. It cuts 
across party lines thereby undermining the 
effectiveness of party machinery. The majority of 
voters do not have a strong position – a 
considerable number of them can be won over by 
good and convincing campaigning.  
 
People vote according to instinct and intuition or 
logic and reasons. Not both. Those following 
instinct and intuition can rarely if ever be won 
over by rational arguments; they do not want 
somebody to rock the boat and the heavier the 
bombardment, the more entrenched they become 
in the already taken belief.  
 
Three elements coruscate defining the yes-no 
contest. Intuition and emotions blended with 
history may decide voter preferences long before 
the start of the campaign. Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s words on 30 November 1979 
‘I want my money back’ sowed the suspicion that 
there was something inherently wrong with the 
EU, operating surreptitiously to rob honest Britons 
of hard earned money. The way people judge 
influence on their daily life – prices in the 
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supermarket weigh heavier than military strategy, 
financial crises, and the global business cycle. 
Stories of red tape and bureaucracy are believed 
because few have tried ‘dealing with Brussel’ so 
they cannot counterbalance such stories with 
personal experiences. High power distance fuels 
the incentive to vote no.   
 
The more important the issue the more likely it is 
that the turnout will be large and people vote 
according to the advice of authorities and the 
establishment. In 1972 the turn out in the Danish 
referendum on joining the EU was 90.4 percent 
and 63.4 percent voted yes. Rationality, reason, 
and logic can only be brought into play if the 
electorate comprehends the significance for them. 
If the perception is the opposite, then clichés and 
trite arguments will crowd out sober 
considerations; the turnout will be small and the 
no vote prevails. Add to that voters stand ready to 
use the referendum to teach the establishment a 
lesson.  
 
Analysing the line followed by the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron it seems permissible to 
conclude that his original tactic was to unite the 
Tory party by asking for and getting some new 
terms from the EU, which could then lead to a 
referendum resulting in a yes vote. Several birds 
could be killed with this stone. Except for a limited 
hard core, the party would unite under the banner 
of putting the question before the people. The 
sceptics in the party could be won over when told 
that the matter was referred to the people and 
who could speak with a stronger voice than the 
British people. The Labour party had chosen to 
oppose a referendum, which would make this 
itinerary more palatable for Tory sceptics. Even if 
some noise would be heard on the run up to the 
referendum the Prime Minister could control the 
party promising a victory that would solidify its 
hold on power in Westminster. After having 
manoeuvred to pacify both the sceptics and the 
yes camp he would come out strongly in favour of 
yes using his authority to convince sceptical Tory 
MPs and voters. The additional unsaid argument 
that the core of new terms would be about 
removing shackles from the EU on labour market 
rules would make it even more tantalizing in the 
eyes of the Tory party.  
 
Unfortunately, Prime Minister Cameron faces the 
unpleasant situation that this political course has 
been derailed; nothing has turned out as 
predicted or expected.  
 
The Tory party has not united behind the Prime 
Minister on the “in-out” issue even after winning 
the May 2015 general elections. On the contrary; 
the divisions inside the party are growing  every 
day even opening up for the somewhat strange 
situation that ministers should be free to vote 
against the government. The party is busy tearing 
itself apart instead of closing ranks, and some 
prominent Tories regard this as an opportunity to 
topple the Prime Minister. That may be what it is, 
but the voters conclude that if Britain “in or out of 
the EU” is not more important than a tool in 
leadership of the conservative party they will tend 
to abstain or vote no.  
 
The Labour party has not been put in difficulties, 
but simply stated after the general election that it 
now accepts a referendum. This is a low profile 
position leaving it to the government to do the 
work while it can sit on the fence watching the 
Tories throwing mud at each other. 
 
During the process stretching back to David 
Cameron’s early days as leader he has not 
shown clear commitment to the EU or any 
consistency in his EU policy. Because of this, not 
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many Britons will go to the ballot box thinking that 
the Prime Minister wants me to vote yes and I 
trust him so I will do so even if I do not 
understand much of what all this is about.  
It is agonising to reach the conclusion that the 
preparation of the referendum has been 
mismanaged and the seeds of a likely no majority 
sown making it a Herculean task to reverse 
course. The sceptics among voter will vigilantly 
follow the events and trumpet any U-turns or 
shortcomings or failures.   
 
What does Britain want - Treaty change or 
separate arrangement 
 
In principle Britain can go for either treaty 
changes or a separate arrangement – a 
combination is also thinkable. 
 
A treaty change is a hazardous enterprise with a 
high risk of running aground. For a start all 
member states (28) have to agree and afterwards 
go through ratification processes according to 
their constitutional procedures. At best it is a time 
consuming, at worst it opens up the opportunity 
for some member states to ask for something in 
return. For example, Spain on the status of 
Gibraltar? Such ‘blackmail’ may be rejected, but 
that will be laborious, and expose the vulnerability 
of the exercise. The more far reaching changes 
Britain asks for, the more likely it is that some 
countries may resort also to a national 
referendum. In 1987 the Irish Supreme Court 
established that ratification by Ireland of any 
significant amendment to the treaties of the 
European Union requires an amendment to the 
Constitution of Ireland. All Constitutional 
amendments then require approval by 
referendum. 
 
The British government has obfuscated the 
crucial issue of whether it wants a ‘better’ EU or 
feather one’s own nest. Does it want treaty 
changes solely applicable to Britain – which is 
really what a part of the Tory party looks for 
talking about ‘sovereignty back to Britain’ – or 
does it want amendments applicable to all 
member states? The strategy and tactic is not the 
same. The first itinerary (a ‘better’ EU for all) 
requires coalition building and consensus building 
stretching over years supported by powerful 
arguments. It is somewhat of an Odyssey. The 
other 27 member states need to be convinced 
that Britain has raised an issue that is not 
exclusively British. So far the British government 
has not been able to get across that the problems 
listed are European problems, and worse still, 
some of the amendments on Britain’s wish list will 
be harmful to Central- and Eastern European 
countries with workers going to Britain under the 
rules of free movement of labour. The alternative 
– a British problem – is simpler and can in 
principle be achieved faster, but is embedded 
with the disadvantage of having to argue 
convincingly that Britain is a special case – 
different from other member states – while at the 
same time belonging to the club. It is in fact a 
devilish challenge to steer this course and so far 
the philosopher’s stone has eluded Britain.     
 
For argument’s sake let’s suppose that a treaty 
change is accomplished and that a large part of 
the Tory party accepts these amendments as 
‘enough’- a rosy scenario. The campaign for a 
yes vote will take place under the cloud that no 
one knows whether the treaty change will be 
ratified by other member states. Suppose that the 
Prime Minister is asked what he will do if one or 
two member states do not ratify? What do you 
expect him to answer? Postponing the 
referendum till all member states have ratified is 
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not viable because some will not do so unless 
Britain is on-board. Trivial matters maybe, but 
they will cast a cloud of duplicity over the 
campaign. Ratifications take time. The Treaty on 
European Union was signed in December 1991 
and entered into force 1 November 1993 – 
ratification took 20 months. Even if the British 
government sticks to its original timetable of 2017 
such a long ratification timetable requires 
negotiation to end at the latest beginning 2016. 
Probably 20 months are optimistic bearing in 
mind that the Treaty on European Union had to 
be ratified by 12 member states while a treaty 
change for Britain will be submitted to 28 member 
states some of which may not regard it as the 
most pressing issue. 
 
Margaret Thatcher once called the European 
Parliament (EP) a ‘Mickey Mouse’ parliament - 
something that still smart. The EP may not have 
the power to block the treaty changes, but it 
needs to be consulted. There are many tricks to 
delay and complicate the issue if it so wishes and 
it is likely that it would enjoy throwing a spanner 
into the works.  
 
Irrespective of treaty changes or not the 
European Parliament has to say yes when turning 
political promises into legal acts. The Treaty on 
European Union from 1993 introduced co-
decision. Subsequent treaty changes have 
strengthened the EP. The ordinary legislative 
procedure gives the same weight to the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union; the vast majority of European laws are 
adopted jointly by the European Parliament and 
the Council – neither of them can decide without 
the consent of the other. Among those sectors 
covered by co-decision is jobs and social policy; 
precisely in the sector chosen by Britain as 
battleground.  
For Germany and France, with their own general 
elections in 2017 –  ratification in these countries 
followed by a referendum in Britain is at the 
bottom of what these two countries wish, pushing 
a treaty change demanded by Britain into outer 
space.  
 
Instead of treaty change, a much more likely 
outcome is for Britain to negotiate a binding 
agreement specifying exceptions for Britain.   
 
The Danish Experience – The Edinburgh 
agreement. 
 
The Danish experience from 1992 and 1993 
comes in handy. In 1992 a tiny majority of those 
who voted chose to say no to the Treaty on 
European Union. After negotiations the electorate 
was asked whether they thought the Edinburgh 
agreement granting Denmark four exceptions 
warranted a yes vote. The result was a yes and 
Denmark has since participated in the EU on this 
basis.  What are the lessons to be drawn from the 
Danish experience? 
 
First, the chain of events underline that a member 
state cannot ask for changes in the general 
provisions of the treaty to solve its own problems. 
That can only be done if all other member states 
agree that the problems or questions merit a 
treaty change because it affects all of them.   
 
On the other hand there are almost no limits to 
what a member state can get of special clauses, 
provisions or derogations or transitional periods 
uniquely aiming at its specific problems provided 
they do not violate the treaties. In Denmark’s 
case the Edinburgh Agreement says ‘particular 
problems existing at the present time specifically 
for Denmark and raised in its memorandum 
'Denmark in Europe' of 30 October 1992’/ 
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The EU and the member states will not twist the 
foundation – objectives and instruments – to 
accommodate Britain, but will go a long way to 
offer concessions provided that Britain fulfils a 
number of conditions.  
 
Britain must accept the principles of the existing 
treaty – subscribe to the goals set out in the 
preamble and the articles. This was repeatedly 
communicated to Denmark. The following 
wording cut the Gordian knot: ‘The European 
Council has agreed on the following set of 
arrangements, which are fully compatible with the 
Treaty, are designed to meet Danish concerns, 
and therefore apply exclusively to Denmark and 
not to other existing or acceding Member States’. 
A final declaration says that ‘The Decision and 
Declarations above are a response to the result of 
the Danish referendum of 2 June 1992 on 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. As far as 
Denmark is concerned, the objectives of that 
Treaty in the four areas mentioned in sections A 
to D of the Decision are to be seen in the light of 
these documents, which are compatible with the 
Treaty and do not call its objectives into question’. 
This was not without difficulties for Denmark in 
view of the Danish memorandum going some way 
towards questioning the objectives of the treaty, 
but the other member states were adamant.  
 
Second, the member state in question must 
accept the loss of influence declaring and 
agreeing that it will not interfere in the integration 
among the other member states in sectors where 
it has asked for and got exceptions. The text in 
the Edinburgh agreement reads ‘noting that 
objectives, Denmark does not intend to make use 
of the following provisions in such a way as to 
prevent closer cooperation and action among 
Member States compatible with the Treaty and 
within the framework of the Union’. This was not a 
problem for Denmark, but could easily turn out to 
be so for Britain in view of the banking union. The 
City of London has vested interests that may 
need an active policy inside the EU, but that is 
hardly conceivable for Britain standing outside the 
single currency. 
 
Third, subscribing to the treaty makes it 
necessary for exceptions to be limited in time. A 
permanent exception would in principle be the 
same as stepping out of certain treaty provisions. 
This is where the difference between opt-outs and 
opt-ins change from vocabulary to politics. Britain 
seeks opt outs, which means that exceptions are 
in principle for ever thus in reality breaking the 
commitment to the objectives and instruments 
enshrined in the treaty. Denmark got opt-ins, 
which means that in principle they are temporary. 
This is explicitly stated by saying ‘at any time 
Denmark may, in accordance with its 
constitutional requirements, inform other Member 
States that it no longer wishes to avail itself of all 
or part of this decision. In that event, Denmark will 
apply in full all relevant measures then in force 
taken within the framework of the European 
Union’. The only reason for such a paragraph is 
obviously to keep the option open of opting out of 
the exceptions and opting in to the treaty. This 
was further borne out by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Denmark in the Parliament (March 30, 
1993) declaring that it was up to Denmark to 
decide on skipping the exceptions, but all political 
parties supporting the Edinburgh agreement 
(seven out of eight parties in the parliament) 
pledged that it required a referendum. The only 
reason to stipulate a procedure for opting in is to 
keep this option open. 
 
Fourth, the member state in question must 
convince the other member states that it can win 
a referendum and is totally committed to fight for 
EU Centre Policy Brief 6 
 
  
a yes. Otherwise the other member states will be 
reluctant to offer concessions especially if they 
may be harmful for some of them. 
 
Denmark published a white paper 20 September 
1992 – less than four months after the first 
referendum 2 June 1992 followed by a 
memorandum 30 October 1992 setting out what it 
wanted. A thorough analysis to prepare the 
ground was followed by a policy paper. A large 
number of consultations with other member states 
and intensive political discussions at home 
ensured that these two papers did not come as a 
surprise. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
Denmark initiated meetings with the President of 
the Commission and the President of the 
European Parliament to seek good will and 
explain the Danish positions even if these two 
institutions were not directly involved in the 
negotiations. The meetings took place at the end 
of November prior to the decisive meeting in 
Edinburgh December 1992 of The European 
Council. 
 
This had a large leverage on the subsequent 
referendum. Denmark did not deviate from the 
memorandum. The Edinburgh agreement is in 
conformity with the memorandum. The population 
could see that the process was steered by the 
government and not by EU institutions or other 
member states. The more this became clear the 
easier it looked to get the concessions and 
subsequently a yes vote. 
 
It is dangerous to overshoot in the sense that a 
member country – in this case Britain – asks for 
too much and has to backpedal for eventually 
agreeing to something less than put forward in 
the opening phase. Those against EU 
membership will jump on what is missing and 
make a big case out of it.   
The referendum – the campaign 
 
The final phase is the campaign itself. It has to be 
prepared, planned and striking the right cords 
with the electorate.  
 
Experience discloses that the debate will not be 
about good or bad for Britain, but whether the 
result was what the Prime Minster wanted, 
whether the provisions are water proof (legally 
binding), and whether it actually is good – not 
good enough, but good. The no camp will 
insidiously look for all kind of reports, drafts, 
committee summaries, in particular from the 
European Parliament that contradict the 
government. ‘The European parliament has 
decided’ is a phrase the British public better get 
used to as the no camp would present papers as 
if they were adopted by the European Parliament 
even if in reality these papers would not stand 
any chance of being tabled at all. The no camp 
will likely also invoke the Court of Justice asking 
the Prime Minister hypothetical questions such as 
‘suppose a different interpretation is adopted by 
other member states , business or private 
persons, can the Prime Minister guarantee that 
the Court of Justice will not rule against Britain’. 
This is not high-falutin nonsense, just think of the 
workers from Central- and Eastern Europe losing 
or fearing to lose non-discrimination.  
 
Most of the media coverage will go to the 
dissenters and sceptics tearing the 
establishment’s arguments to shreds. Irrespective 
of the large number of politicians, business 
people and economists all advocating a yes 
somebody will pop up raising doubt over whether 
this is actually good or the correct thing. Already 
now we are served out the argument that outside 
the EU Britain is ‘free’ to export more to Emerging 
Markets and Developing Economies (EMDE) 
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without anybody nailing down the counter 
question how on earth that should be the case. 
The mainstream is convinced that the costs for 
the City of London will be limited, but Britain 
wants to make it more difficult to get into Britain to 
work with obvious negative consequences for the 
City of London.   
 
In this phase – obviously crucial – credibility takes 
over as the main factor. The run up is not 
promising. The confusion inside the Tory party, 
the laid back attitude of the Labour party and the 
Scottish National Party sitting on the fence means 
that the electorate will be baffled not knowing 
what is right or wrong – good or bad. 
 
The Danish experience tells that the doubters 
participating in the debate push the electorate 
towards a no. A long and fluffy article analysing 
one of exceptions putting forward arguments for 
and against is counterproductive for the yes camp 
even if the writer ends by stating that he/she will 
vote yes This can be explained by the fact that a 
large part of the electorate is in doubt themselves 
and their doubt is compounded by such an article 
– so they end up by voting no. If campaigning for 
a yes, present powerful arguments for one side 
only. Why Yes.  Forget the other side. It is often 
heard that democracy requires the government to 
guarantee an even-handed debate. But not when 
the government has decided to put the result of 
its negotiations before the people having a firm 
view that the right thing is to say yes.    
 
The second most dangerous trap is failure to 
invest political capital to continue the campaign in 
the face of positive opinion polls that says the yes 
vote will prevail. This conveys first to the party 
and then to the electorate that the matter is not 
important. 
 
Very few referenda are a foregone conclusion. 
Denmark’s case shows that even with solid 
support from the establishment and an 
overwhelming majority in parliament only 55.6 
percent voted yes to the Edinburgh Agreement in 
May 1993.   Consistent and clear arguments, 
hard work and huge amount of political capital 
has to be invested to ensure the outcome you 
want.
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ANNEX 
Denmark and the Treaty on European Union  
 
Official Journal C 348 , 31/12/1992 P. 0001 - 0001 
(1) DENMARK AND THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (92/C 348/01) 
The European Council recalled that the entry into force of the Treaty signed in Maastricht requires 
ratification by all the twelve Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional re-
quirements, and reaffirmed the importance of concluding the process as soon as possible, without 
reopening the present text, as foreseen in Article R of the Treaty.  
The European Council noted that Denmark has submitted to Member States on 30 October a doc-
ument entitled 'Denmark in Europe', which sets out the following points as being of particular im-
portance:  
- the defence policy dimension,  
- the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union,  
- citizenship of the Union,  
- cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs,  
- openness and transparency in the Community's decision-making process,  
- the effective application of the principle of subsidiarity,  
- promotion of cooperation between the Member States to combat unemployment.  
Against this background, the European Council has agreed on the following set of arrangements, 
which are fully compatible with the Treaty, are designed to meet Danish concerns, and therefore 
apply exclusively to Denmark and not to other existing or acceding Member States:  
(a) Decision concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty on European Union 
(Annex 1). This Decision will take effect on the date of entry into force of the Treaty on European 
Union;  
(b) the declaration in Annex 2.  
The European Council has also taken cognizance of the unilateral declarations in Annex 3, which 
will be associated with the Danish act of ratification of the Treaty on European Union.  
(1) European Council, Edinburgh, 11 and 12 December 1992; Conclusions of the Presidency, Part 
B.  
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ANNEX 1  
DECISION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, MEETING WITHIN THE EURO-
PEAN COUNCIL, CONCERNING CERTAIN PROBLEMS RAISED BY DENMARK ON THE 
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION The Heads of State and Government, meeting within the Euro-
pean Council, whose Governments are signatories of the Treaty on European Union, which in-
volves independent and sovereign States having freely decided, in accordance with the existing 
Treaties, to exercise in common some of their competences,  
- desiring to settle, in conformity with the Treaty on European Union, particular problems existing 
at the present time specifically for Denmark and raised in its memorandum 'Denmark in Europe' of 
30 October 1992,  
- having regard to the conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council on subsidiarity and trans-
parency,  
- noting the declarations of the Edinburgh European Council relating to Denmark,  
- taking cognizance of the unilateral declarations of Denmark made on the same occasion which 
will be associated with its act of ratification,  
- noting that objectives, Denmark does not intend to make use of the following provisions in such a 
way as to prevent closer cooperation and action among Member States compatible with the Treaty 
and within the framework of the Union and its 
Have agreed on the following decision:  
SECTION A 
Citizenship 
The provisions of Part Two of the Treaty establishing the European Community relating to citizen-
ship of the Union give nationals of the Member States additional rights and protection as specified 
in that Part. They do not in any way take the place of national citizenship. The question whether an 
individual possesses the nationality of a Member State will be settled solely by reference to the 
national law of the Member State concerned.  
SECTION B 
Economic and Monetary Union 
1. The Protocol on certain provisions relating to Denmark attached to the Treaty establishing the 
European Community gives Denmark the right to notify the Council of the European Communities 
of its position concerning participation in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union. Den-
mark has given notification that it will not participate in the third stage. This notification will take ef-
fect upon the coming into effect of this decision.  
2. As a consequence, Denmark will not participate in the single currency, will not be bound by the 
rules concerning economic policy which apply only to the Member States participating in the third 
stage of Economic and Monetary Union, and will retain its existing powers in the field of monetary 
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policy according to its national laws and regulations, including powers of the National Bank of 
Denmark in the field of monetary policy.  
3. Denmark will participate fully in the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union and will 
continue to participate in exchange-rate cooperation within the European Monetary System (EMS).  
SECTION C 
Defence Policy 
The Heads of State and Government note that, in response to the invitation from the Western Eu-
ropean Union (WEU), Denmark has become an observer to that organization. They also note that 
nothing in the Treaty on European Union commits Denmark to become a member of the WEU. 
Accordingly, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions 
and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of 
closer cooperation between Member States in this area.  
SECTION D 
Justice and Home affairs 
Denmark will participate fully in cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs on the basis of the provi-
sions of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.  
SECTION E 
Final provisions 
1. This decision will take effect on the date of entry into force of the Treaty on European Union; its 
duration shall be governed by Articles Q and N(2) of that Treaty.  
2. At any time Denmark may, in accordance with its constitutional requirements, inform other 
Member States that it no longer wishes to avail itself of all or part of this decision. In that event, 
Denmark will apply in full all relevant measures then in force taken within the framework of the Eu-
ropean Union.  
FINAL DECLARATION 
The Decision and Declarations above are a response to the result of the Danish referendum of 2 
June 1992 on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. As far as Denmark is concerned, the objectives 
of that Treaty in the four areas mentioned in sections A to D of the Decision are to be seen in the 
light of these documents, which are compatible with the Treaty and do not call its objectives into 
question.  
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